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ABSTRACT
Software Defined Networks (SDN) provide vital benefits
to network administrators by offering global visibility and
network-wide control over the switching infrastructure of
the network. It is rather much difficult to obtain the same
benefits in the presence of middleboxes (MBs), due to (i)
lack of a proper topology discovery mechanism in environ-
ments with a mix of forwarding devices and middleboxes.
(ii) lack of generic APIs to abstract and gain control on these
rigid and heterogeneous third-party middleboxes (iii) lack of
a generic network infrastructure framework to monitor and
verify any specific device or path connectivity status in the
network. These limitations make automation of network op-
erations such as, network-wide monitoring, policy enforce-
ment and rule-placement much difficult to handle. Hence,
there is a greater urge even from middlebox vendors, to bet-
ter handle the control and visibility aspects [8, 12, 21] of
the network in presence of middleboxes.
In this paper, we propose a Unified network infrastruc-
ture framework for gaining global network visibility, by
discovering the network topology in the presence of mid-
dleboxes, along with a framework to support the end-to-
end path connectivity verification, independent of SDN. We
have also addressed security aspects and provided necessary
APIs to support our framework.
CCS Concepts
•Networks → Middle boxes / network appli-
ances; Network experimentation;
Keywords
Middlebox topology discovery
1. INTRODUCTION
Today’s enterprise networks are proliferating with vast
number of specialized devices or middleboxes [19, 17],
indeed the middlebox market is considered as one of the
fastest growing market segments with Compound An-
nual Growth Rate(CAGR) [2] of 11%. Even with such
a rapid growth rate and maturity in middlebox mar-
ket, we still lack a standard interface to control these
devices or a framework to unify them. Hence, gaining
global network visibility in the presence of middleboxes
is considered as one of biggest challenges in the network.
Consider for example, enforcing Network Function
Chain rules on to network flows requires the admin-
istrator to calculate the candidate paths and identify
right devices (switches and middleboxes) to place the
rules. In dynamic networks of huge size, such network
management solutions can not be automated with out
having access to complete network topology. Also, the
different middlebox deployment mechanisms adapted in
today’s enterprise networks, such as inline (i.e., output
of one middlebox is directly connected to input of other
middle box), offline (i.e., middleboxes doesn’t fall in
the active path of the traffic, the traffic is steered to
them using forwarding devices) cluster and tree topolo-
gies makes automatic topology discovery a complicated
task.
The existing discovery protocols such as
LLDP/BDDP [14] can not be used directly with
middleboxes, as they are limited only to ethernet
segment. Also, these protocols have limitations discov-
ering devices with TAP, virtual and VLAN interfaces,
and are not compatible with VPN and other overlay
technologies. Other protocols such as SNMP (Simple
Network Management Protocol) and MIDCOM [20]
are configuration based device management protocols,
lacking capability to automatically discover the topol-
ogy of middleboxes. Tracebox [6], TCPM [11], MIDAS
[1] and RSVP [5] could only be used in determining the
middleboxes along a specific path of the network. All
these mechanisms requires a separate traffic generating
entity to initiate special requests for discovering the
middleboxes along the path. But, obtaining such
vantage points to generate such traffic to extract the
path details might not always be feasible in network
deployments. Recent work HybridSDN [9] proposed a
topology discovery mechanism in hybrid enterprise net-
works using dynamic routing protocols, by completely
discarding the middleboxes. Most importantly, the
discovery protocols discussed above lacks security and
are prone to visibility poisoning attacks [10] and data
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Figure 1: Unified enterprise network architecture.
leaks. Hence, there is strong need for an effective and
secured topology discovery mechanism in the presence
of middleboxes. Importantly, we utilize the capabilities
of middleboxes itself to generate the probes without
using other special devices as suggested in other
approaches [6, 11, 1, 5]. Our main contributions in this
position paper includes obtaining better visibility over
the enterprise networks by building,
• a probe-based secured topology discovery mecha-
nism for middleboxes, independent of SDN.
• probe-based framework for end-to-end path con-
nectivity verification.
• generic middlebox APIs to support our topology
discovery framework.
2. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The Unified network infrastructure framework shown
in figure 1 uses a simple text based application protocol
(shown in figure 7) for topology discovery mechanism.
In this approach, the probe message is generated be-
tween set of middleboxes and it is allowed to traverse
the network, and these traversal details are used to build
the topology of middleboxes. This process is repeated
until the complete middlebox topology is discovered.
The intricate details of this probe-based topology dis-
covery mechanism is discussed in section 3. The main
functional components of this high level system archi-
tecture is detailed below,
2.1 Topology Manager
This module has three functional sub-components
i.e., Topology Extraction and Abstraction module
(TEA), Probe-pair Selection Function (PSF) and Of-
fline Verification module to help build the topology
and verify it. The topology Manager consolidates the
topology details obtained from both SDN and MB Con-
trollers to build the complete network topology.
Topology Extraction & Abstraction. This module
basically performs two different functions, topology dis-
covery and end-to-end path connectivity verification. It
devise a means to select and optimize the right set of
probe-pairs1 required to discover the network topology.
The topology manager triggers source middlebox (MB
Agent) of the probe-pair to generate a probe message
and forwards it further to destination middlebox of the
probe-pair. This module collects the reports sent by the
middleboxes along the path of probe traversal to incre-
mentally build the topology. TEA module also triggers
a special type of probe message for checking the path
connectivity.
Offline Verification. This module helps TEA to ver-
ify the topology built through probe-based discovery
mechanism and report discrepancies if any.
Probe-pair Selection Function. This helper func-
tion uses heuristics for selecting the right probe-pair
combination for topology discovery, as explained in sec-
tion 3.2.
2.2 MB Agent
The MB Agent has following functional sub-
components, Transparent Proxy Based Agent (TPA),
Probe Handler (PH ) and Probe Tracking & Control
(PTC ) module. The high level middlebox architecture
of MB Agent is shown in figure 3.
Transparent Proxy based Agent. TPA is a trans-
parent proxy module which digests, generates and for-
wards the probes traversing through it. It also acts as
an interface between the middlebox and MB Controller.
Probe Handler. This module handles both the dis-
covery and path connectivity verification probes and
forwards them depending on type of the probe message.
Probe Tracking and Control. PTC steers the probe
message on any specific output interface as guided by
the MB Agent, which also helps in monitoring the out-
going probe message.
2.3 Topology Discovery Probes
We use two types of probe messages, one for topol-
ogy discovery (Discovery probe) and other for path con-
nectivity verification (path checker probe). The path-id
field in the probe header and the port number differen-
tiates these two types of probe messages.
2.4 Middlebox APIs and Messages
MB APIs are used for interfacing the communica-
tion between MB Agents and MB controller (Topology
Manager). The important APIs used in our proto-
type are, DEVICE-CAPABILITIES used to exchange the
1Pair of middleboxes, a source & destination middlebox be-
tween which the probe traverses to discover the topology.
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Figure 2: Initial phase network view.
details of each of the middlebox with MB Controller,
PROBE-INIT to trigger the MB Agent to initiate a probe
message to destination middlebox with specific security
header flags, PROBE-UPDATE to update the received
probe message details to the MB Controller, UPDATE-
OUTINTERFACE to update the corrected output inter-
face of probe to the MB Controller, RESOLVE-PROBEID
to resolve the Random Number to Probe-pair IP ad-
dresses when header security is enabled, HEARTBEAT
to update the device status to the MB Controller.
3. TOPOLOGY DISCOVERY
As part of topology discovery mechanism, middle-
boxes i.e., MB Agents initially exchanges their device-
capabilities with MB Controller (Topology Manager).
The consolidated details at the Topology Manager af-
ter this Initial capabilities exchange phase is shown in
figure 2, as list of discrete middlebox nodes and SDN
topology Islands (if available). For exposing the device
capabilities we are using Graybox model, rather than us-
ing Whitebox model requiring the middlebox vendors to
expose Full state machine (FSM) details, which vendors
will not be comfortable exposing.
3.1 Probe-based Topology Discovery
The topology manager selects a probe-pair from
list of available middleboxes after the initial DEVICE-
CAPABILITIES exchange. It then sends PROBE-INIT
message to trigger the source MB Agent to initiate a
probe to its destination middlebox, as illustrated in fig-
ure 6. The details of the probe-pair selection is men-
tioned in the section 3.2. As most of the middleboxes
are multi-homed devices, the middlebox agent chooses
suitable interface of the selected probe-pair to generate
the traffic between those interfaces of the Probe-pair.
The MB Agent of the source middlebox generates
probes to all the interface IP addresses of the destina-
tion probe-pair, only if there are alternate routes avail-
able to the destination middlebox interfaces from the
source middlebox. When the probe message encoun-
ters a SDN switch in its path, the probe details are
exchanged with the SDN Controller (floodlight) and
then the SDN Controller forwards it out of the switch
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Figure 3: High level middlebox architecture.
through a Packet-out message. Similarly, when the
probe message encounters a middlebox in its path, the
PREROUTING2 Probe-Handler module in the middlebox
as shown in figure 3 takes the probe message up the
layer to MB Agent by using redirect rules. The MB
Agent then digests this probe message and further for-
wards it out of the middlebox. The POSTROUTING3
Probe Tracking and Control module tracks the probe
messages going out of the device and update the details
to MB Agent, which indeed exchanges these details to
Topology Manger through MB controller.
Populating the Probe Payload. Before sending the
probe out of middlebox, it is populated with the current
device details along with its input and output interfaces
the probe has taken. Calculating the output interface
details of probe, even before it is sent out is a difficult
task, as certain devices like load-balancers might choose
different output interface dynamically.
We handle this situation using two different ap-
proaches, (i) The output interface is calculated using
the route details of the device and updated to the probe
payload. Later, the calculated output interface value is
compared with the actual output interface taken by the
probe and the corrected value is updated to the Topol-
ogy Manager using UPDATE-OUTINTERFACE API. (ii) In
the other approach, rather than using default route poli-
cies, the MB Agent statically calculates the output in-
terface for destination IP of the probe and steers it out
on that specific interface using the PTC module.
Probe Discovery Termination. The topology man-
ager maintains discovered and undiscovered interfaces
list of all middleboxes in the network and the probe-
pairs are always selected from the undiscovered list.
Once all the interfaces of a middlebox are discovered
(i.e., links to their adjacent nodes) through our probe-
based discovery mechanism, it is moved from ’undis-
covered list’ to ’discovered list’. The topology discovery
2Handling Ingress packets before routing decision.
3Handling Egress packets after routing decision.
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process terminates when the middleboxes in the undis-
covered list are either completely exhausted or left out
with only edge-middlebox interfaces for which the link
connectivity couldn’t be directly discovered. We could
easily identify these interfaces in advance before the
discovery process itself, using approaches mentioned in
section 3.2. Also, importantly we will not iterate the
discovery process over same probe-pair interface more
than twice to avoid discovery mechanism from running
in to loops.
Late Discovery. In networks with mix of SDN
switches and middleboxes, certain interface links of
middleboxes that are directly connected to edge SDN
switches are left out from discovery, which are discov-
ered lately when actual traffic starts flowing through
that interface as illustrated in figure 5.
3.2 Probe-pair selection & heuristics
In our approach, we use following heuristics to auto-
matically identify the edge-devices in the network as
probe-pairs. In general, the edge devices are those
which lie in the east-west boundaries of the network,
when chosen as probe-pairs they are expected to dis-
cover more number of devices along its path effectively
reducing the number of probes or up-calls needed to
build the topology.
Heuristic 1: Interface based probe-pair selec-
tion. Certain devices can automatically be identified
as edge device depending on their interface sub-nets,
i.e., a device is considered as edge if none of it’s inter-
face IP addresses falls under the same IP sub-net of any
other middleboxes in the network.
Heuristic 2: Policy based probe pair selection.
In this approach, we used network policies (policy con-
figuration file), to extract edge devices in the network.
This is achieved by grouping the network policies on
the basis of their source and destination networks and
comparing with the interface IP addresses of the mid-
dleboxes, we were able to identify the edge devices by
matching their networks. Though these heuristics are
not any standard approaches, but, still it reduced the
probes inside network by around 10 to 35%.
3.3 End-to-end path connectivity Verification
In general, finding end-to-end path connectivity in-
side a complex network for a specific traffic or service is
not a straight forward task. It requires the administra-
tor to have vantage points in the network for generating
test traffic, and also requires a means to manually verify
all the devices along the path.
Approach. With our approach, the Topology Manager
pre-configures all the devices in the path (to be verified)
with port based(transport) routing rules depending on
the path-id. After this initial path setup is done, the
Topology Manager triggers the source middlebox (MB
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MB4
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Figure 4: Probe-based path connectivity checker.
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Figure 5: Overall topology discovery mechanism.
Agent) to generate a path checker probe message with
a specific path-id. The middleboxes forwards this probe
message on the basis of the path-id, which is illustrated
in the figure 4. The Probe-Handler and PTC modules
present in each of the middlebox uses the port based
routing to steer this probe message through the speci-
fied path pertaining to the path-id.
3.4 Reduce Up-call count (Probe-append)
In contrast to existing approach (Approach 1) as il-
lustrated in figure 6, rather than making an up-call4 at
each node of probe traversal, the payload of the probe
message is appended with the current node details. This
process of payload appending is carried out all the way
till probe reaches the destination probe-pair middlebox,
where an up-call is finally made to the MB controller
as shown in figure 6 (Approach 2). The only exception
to this probe handling approach is, when the probe en-
counters a SDN switch in the middle of its traversal, it
simply forwards the probe further.
3.5 Static topology verification (Simulator)
This tool is specially designed and implemented to
simulate the probe-based topology discovery mechanism
in the presence of middleboxes, for testing the large
scale networks. The inputs (list of middleboxes, their
interfaces and route details) required to this tool are
provided as a network configuration file.
4. PROBE SECURITY & PROTOCOL
In this section, we demonstrate security support to our
4Message to MB Controller updating the probe details.
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probe mechanisms mentioned in Approaches 1 and 2
(figure 6). By securing the probe header and payload,
we protect it against the topology poisoning, data leak
and data tampering attacks. We limit our threat model
to network eavesdropping, while the compromised mid-
dleboxes could still poison our network topology. The
protocol details are shown in figure 7.
4.1 Probe Header details
The probe message header fields are detailed below,
Probe-TTL. At each hop the middlebox agent incre-
ments this field (counter) by 1, before forwarding it fur-
ther and it is discarded when the Probe-TTL reaches
the maximum threshold value configured by the Topol-
ogy Manager. This field helps in detecting both the se-
quence and the number of devices the probe traversed
in the network.
Path-id. The path-id field serves two different pur-
poses, it identifies the type of probe messages i.e., dis-
covery probe (path-id=0) or path checker probe (path-
id>0) and also defines the path for the probe traversal.
PayloadLength. This field is used for storing the
probe payload size, which is updated at each hop.
Flag:Payload-append. This flag forces the MB Agent
to append device details to the probe payload before
forwarding it further, avoiding the up-call at each hop.
Probe-pair-ID. This header field carries either probe-
pair IP addresses or the Random Number depending on
the header-sec flag.
Flag: header-sec. This field defines if the ’probe-
pair-ID ’ header field carries the probe-pair IP address
directly or else uses the Random Number to hide the
probe-pair details. Middleboxes along the path resolves
this Random Number to the IP address of the probe-
pair using the ’RESOLVE-PROBEID’ API.
Flag: Payload-Sec. This flag defines the encryption
status of the payload.
4.2 Payload security
Our approach uses both the symmetric key and pub-
lic key encryption mechanisms for securing the payload
IP UDP
Probe 
Header
Probe Payload
IP UDP
Probe
Header
Probe Payload1Probe Payload2 Probe Payload3
Hostname: mme37.testdev.com
Management IP: 130.12.10.11
Input Interface name:/number: 1(eth1)
Input Interface IP: 1.2.3.4 
Output Interface name:/number: 2(eth2)
Output Interface IP: 2.3.4.5 
SHA Hash Signature
Probe-TTL: 0 – 255
Payload Length : 76
Flag: payload–append: 0 / 1
Flag: payload–sec: 0 / 1
Flag: header–sec : 0 / 1
Path-id: 0
Probe–pair–ID: SrcIP::DstIP
/ Random number
Approach 1:
Single Probe Payload
Approach 2: Multiple Appended Probe Payloads
Figure 7: Probe message header and payload
details.
data. The encryption procedure is detailed below,
1. Initially, the probe payload is encrypted using the
random AES symmetric key generated by the MB
Agent inside the middlebox.
2. For providing data-integrity hash the en-
crypted data along with some of the important
header fields (probe-pair-ID, Flag:header-sec,
Flag:payload-sec and Flag:ProbeAppend) using
the SHA-256.
3. The generated AES key and the hash calculated
on the ’header and encrypted data’ is again en-
crypted using the public key distributed by the
MB Controller.
4. The encrypted key and hash is concatenated with
encrypted payload message and forwarded further.
while the field payload-sec defines the security of pay-
load. Depending on the payload-append field, the en-
crypted payload is either shared with the controller at
each hop or appended till the destination probe-pair,
when the MB controller receives the encrypted payload,
the AES key and hash is extracted first using private
key of the MB Controller. Later the AES key is used
to decrypt the actual payload content. The MB Con-
troller recalculates the hash on the probe and compares
it with the hash values stored in the payload for data in-
tegrity. The payload security is tested with Nacl (salt)
[13] integrated as part of both the MB Agent and MB
Controller, this module is considered lighter with better
latency parameters [4] when compared with openssl.
5. IMPLEMENTATION
The MB Agent module integrated into each of middle-
box runs a UDP based transparent proxy integrated
with NaCl (salt) [13] and uses iptables (Netfilter) in
PREROUTING of Probe-Handling module. The Probe
Tracking & Control module helps MB Agent in moni-
toring and steering the outgoing probe messages using
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Topology Avg. Probe-triggers Avg. Up-Calls
(20 Nodes) Edge Random Append Non-
Heur. Select Append
Cisco Ent. 9.71 11.22 9.97 41.66
In-&Offline 8 9.35 8.6 43.7
Tree 6.25 10.25 10.75 35.1
Full Mesh 187.5 195 192.3 403
Table 1: Topologies vs probe-based discovery.
iptables and ip rules. The MB Controller is also inte-
grated with NaCl to handle the encrypted probe mes-
sages.
Compatibility. The code changes that we introduced
in middleboxes pertaining to probe routing doesn’t im-
pact any of the middlebox functionalities. As most of
the third-party middlebox vendors such as Cisco [7], Ju-
niper [18] and Barracuda Networks [3] supports the port
(transport) based routing functionality in their middle-
boxes, it will become easier for us to integrate our so-
lution into the third-party middleboxes.
Assumption. The middleboxes are expected to be
have simple infrastructure routing rules configured to
handle probe messages.
6. EVALUATIONS
The results shown in figure 8 are evaluated considering
the Cisco’s medium scale enterprise network design [15]
topologies with up-to 500 middleboxes and 60 switches,
tested using the simulator tool and the figure shows the
average number of probe-triggers (i.e., probe messages
generated by the middleboxes to discover the topol-
ogy) and up-calls generated for discovering the topol-
ogy, considering both the heuristics described in section
3.2. The table1 shows the simulation results of differ-
ent types of 20-Node topologies, with Mesh and In- and
Offline topologies considered as boundary cases for our
probe-based topology discovery mechanism.
In lab environment, experiments are conducted with
around 40 nodes integrated with our MB Agent on
systems including third-party middleboxes such as
RouteFinder [16] and PC/Server systems. The PC
based systems are also integrated with open-source mid-
dlebox function such as OpenSwan, bro, Squid, Netfil-
ter, openvswitch and vconfig used as IPSec VPN, IDS,
Web Proxy, Firewall, switching and VLAN functions
respectively. We evaluated all our results with differ-
ent topologies that are commonly used in any enter-
prise networks, with an average of around 2.1 to 2.7
interfaces per middlebox, with exception to the fully
connected Mesh topology.
Topology Discovery Time. The average time in-
volved in discovering Cisco’s small scale enterprise net-
work topology with 40 nodes is well with in 5 seconds
and with Nacl (salt) [13] integrated for probe security
it has costed us around 8 sec for the same network.
7. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented an Unified infrastructure
framework and obtained global visibility of enterprise
network in the presence of middleboxes, with key focus
on topology discovery and end-to-end path connectiv-
ity verification. Though this topology discovery mech-
anism is tested specifically to enterprise network device
deployment scenarios, we believe it could be easily ex-
tended to other scenarios and types of networks.
As part of our future work, we (i) plan to integrate
our implementation with Openstack and test it on large
scale test environments. (ii) analyze the overhead in-
volved in different security mechanisms used for topol-
ogy discovery. (iii) reduce discovery time with PROBE-
INIT parallelization.
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